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 One of the more interesting issues in the strategic management field is the question of
whether intra-industry performance differences exist, particularly across strategic
groups. Most of the existing studies have used accounting measures of performance
despite the documented weaknesses of such measures. This paper examines whether
financial market-based measures of performance are superior to accounting-based mea-
sures in identifying performance differences across strategic groups.
 Hypotheses are tested on data from an existing sample of firms in the US pharmaceu-
tical industry.The empirical results indicate that performance differences are more likely
to exist across strategic groups when financial market performance measures are used.
Suggestions for further refinements are made and limitations of the study are discussed.
Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The concept of strategic
groups was introduced to
explain intra-industry
performance differences
Ketchen et al., 1997; McGee and Thomas,
1986; Porter, 1979; Thomas and Venkatraman,
1988). However, a lack of conclusive empiri-
cal support for the relationship between
group membership and performance may cast
doubt on the very foundations of the theory
underlying strategic groups (Barney and
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Introduction
The concept of strategic groups was intro-
duced by Hunt (1972) to explain intra-indus-
try performance differences. Strategic groups
are groups of firms within an industry follow-
ing similar strategies in terms of such key 
decision variables as scope and resource
deployment (McGee and Thomas, 1986;
Porter, 1979) and in theory, performance dif-
ferences are hypothesized to exist across
strategic groups (Caves and Porter, 1977;
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Hoskisson, 1990; Dranove et al., 1998; Hatten
and Hatten, 1987; Tang and Thomas, 1992).
A number of general explanations have been
advanced to explain the mixed results in
empirical studies. The varied research designs
and methodologies employed attract the most
critical comments. More specifically, Ketchen
et al. (1997), in a meta-analysis of 40 empiri-
cal investigations published between 1992 and
1995, identified three characteristics of the
studies that found stronger relationships
between group membership and perfor-
mance, i.e., broad definitions of groups, single-
industry samples and longitudinal designs.The
inconclusive results of earlier studies may also
have been influenced by the inappropriate
choice of clustering methods to form strat-
egic groups. More recently, Ferguson et al.
(2000) and Nair and Kotha (2001) proposed
improved ways of forming groups and
reported significant performance differences
across groups. Newer research has also
embraced richer concepts of firm resources
over time, including dynamic capabilities
(Teece et al., 1997) and there have been a
number of studies examining performance dif-
ferences among groups (Osborne et al., 2001;
Lee et al., 2002; Athanassopoulos, 2003;
Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2004). In addition, more
attention has been paid to the effects of indus-
try-specific and firm-specific assets on differ-
ences in firm performance across strategic
groups (Nair and Kotha, 2001; Hawawini et al.,
2004).
However, this paper focuses attention on
the predominant use of accounting-based mea-
sures of performance rather than financial
market measures of performance to address
intra-industry performance differences. Exist-
ing studies tend to use the accounting-based
measures of performance, such as return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The
only exception is the very recent study by
Hawawini et al. (2004), which used both
accounting-based and value-based measures.
Accounting measures of performance exhibit
several weaknesses in practice, including the
scope for managerial discretion in adjusting
accounting numbers, a short-term measure-
ment bias and their limitations in the valuation
of intangible resources and capabilities
(Barney, 2002).
This paper attempts to discover whether
financial market measures of performance are
superior to accounting measures in identifying
performance differences across strategic
groups. The questions are examined through
an in-depth longitudinal analysis of data drawn
from a single-industry sample — the US phar-
maceutical industry — which was verified in
earlier studies (Bogner et al., 1994, 1996) but
which had used accounting measures of per-
formance exclusively. This sample was chosen
so that the results from earlier work could be
re-evaluated, not only with improved methods
but also with evidence from the use of finan-
cial market-based constructs for measuring
firm performance.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a
brief review of empirical studies examining
the impact of strategic group membership 
on performance is presented. Second, the
research methodology is presented and the
findings are discussed. Finally, the implications
of the results and the conclusions and limita-
tions of the study are reviewed.
Literature review: Performance
differences across strategic groups
As noted above, Hunt (1972) proposed the
theoretical term strategic groups to identify
groups of firms within an industry context fol-
lowing similar strategies across key variables
and argued that performance differences
should exist across strategic groups as a con-
sequence of different resource endowments.
Since then, there have been many studies
having both a theoretical and an empirical
focus. The key empirical studies are examined
here, investigating the relationship between
strategic groups and firm performance — one
of the central topics in the research dedicated
to this subject (McGee and Thomas, 1986;
Cool and Schendel, 1987; Thomas and Venka-
traman, 1988). Theoretically, it has been
pointed out that performance differences exist
between strategic groups (Caves and Porter,
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1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Tang and
Thomas, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman,
1988). However, empirical evidence has been
mixed (e.g., Lawless et al., 1989; Mascarenhas
and Aaker, 1989; Fiegenbaum and Thomas,
1990; Cool and Dierickx, 1993). Some studies
have found performance differences across
groups (e.g., Dess and Davis, 1984; Oster,
1982), while others found no differences in
performance (cf. Cool and Schendel, 1987,
1988; Frazier and Howell, 1983).
In a recent study, Ketchen et al. (1997)
examined 40 empirical investigations of the
relationship between group membership and
performance and found that membership 
does partially explain performance differences.
Moreover, they indicated that studies involv-
ing broader group configurations, single-indus-
try samples and longitudinal designs are more
likely to find a significant relationship. In addi-
tion, it is important to note that many earlier
studies were criticized for the methodologies
employed in clustering groups, which might
also explain some of the non-significant
results. Recent research, e.g., Ferguson et al.
(2000), Nair and Kotha (2001) and Zuniga-
Vicente et al. (2004), using improved methods
for forming strategic groups, has provided
more convincing evidence of performance 
differences.
In addition, few of the existing empirical
studies examine the relationship between
strategic group membership and performance
from a dynamic viewpoint. Teece et al. (1997)
identified that dynamic capabilities are a
source of sustainable advantage in times of
rapid change. However, in the empirical
studies of strategic groups, dynamic capabili-
ties have only recently been taken into
account (Lee et al., 2002; Athanassopoulos,
2003; Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2004). Lee et al.
(2002) develop a simulation model to examine
conditions under which strategic groups
emerge and their performance differences
persist. They find that dynamic capability is
one of the important factors in understanding
the emergence and stability of strategic
groups. In a panel data analysis of the grocery
industry in the UK, Athanassopoulos (2003)
reported a gradual performance decline of the
industry across the time frame. Zuniga-Vicente
et al. (2004) employed a new grouping tech-
nique to examine how the relationship
between performance and strategic groups
varies over time. They found that significant
performance differences among strategic
groups existed in some years but not in others.
Earlier studies also generally failed to con-
sider the effects of firm and industry charac-
teristics when examining the performance
differences across groups. Fiegenbaum and
Thomas (1995) sought to advance the
research on strategic groups by shifting atten-
tion from industry-specific to firm-specific
effects. Dranove et al. (1998) asserted that a
strategic group exists only if the performance
of members is an outcome of group charac-
teristics, after controlling for firm and industry
characteristics. Nair and Kotha (2001) found
that even after controlling for both environ-
ment (industry) and firm-specific effects,
group membership was significantly associ-
ated with firm performance. Hawawini et al.
(2004) re-examined the question of whether
firms’ performance is driven primarily by
industry or firm factors and found that a sig-
nificant proportion of the absolute estimates
of the variance of firm factors was due to the
presence of a few exceptional firms in any
given industry. In other words, only for a few
dominant value creators (leaders) and destroy-
ers (losers) do firm-specific assets seem to
matter significantly more than industry
factors. For most other firms, the industry
effect turns out to be more important for per-
formance than firm-specific factors.
Further complicating the debate is the 
issue of how to measure performance. Indeed,
there has been an extensive contribution in
the strategic management literature about
whether or not performance measures based
on accounting data capture firm performance
adequately (e.g., Barney, 2002; Chakravarthy,
1986; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986). However,
it is noteworthy that in virtually all of the
reported studies, accounting-based measures
have been used to assess performance. It is a
reasonable proposition, therefore, that this 
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Further complicating the
debate is the issue of how
to measure performance
may also be an important reason for the con-
flicting results in those studies. It was only in
a very recent study by Hawawini et al. (2004)
that two value-based measures of firm perfor-
mance were used to test firm performance
across strategic groups — that is, economic
profit (EP) and total market value (TMV).
Accounting-based measures have been criti-
cized for several reasons. Rappaport (1986)
and Doyle (2000) have argued that they are
not appropriate performance measures since
they ignore both risk and the time-value-of-
money, whereas financial market-based mea-
sures of performance account for both factors.
Market-based measures of performance may
be more relevant to strategy research since
they capture expectations of future returns
from firm performance, as opposed to past
outcomes reflected in accounting-based 
measures (Keats and Hitt, 1988; Palich et al.,
2000). In the diversification literature, for
example, Keats and Hitt (1988) found a posi-
tive relationship between diversification and
market performance but no relationship
between diversification and accounting per-
formance. Furthermore, Barney (2002) identi-
fied three limitations to accounting measures
of performance that may have affected the
results of studies of the relationship between
strategic group membership and perfor-
mance: (1) managerial discretion, (2) a short-
term bias and (3) problems with the valuation
of intangible resources and capabilities.
In the first case, managers often have some
discretion in choosing accounting methods
and therefore may be tempted to increase
reported current-period profit to increase
bonuses or to satisfy the expectations of the
financial market. On the other hand, they may
be tempted to decrease reported current-
period profit to decrease the threats of poten-
tial antitrust liability or to increase bargaining
power with external stakeholders. In the
second case, because long-term multiple-year
investments are usually treated for accounting
purposes, as costs in those years where they
do not generate revenues that exceed cost,
accounting-based measures of performance
have a short-term bias. The final limitation of
accounting-based measures of performance is
that they generally do not fully value a firm’s
intangible assets. This is particularly problem-
atic in industries, such as the pharmaceutical
industry, where intangible assets represent a
large portion of a firm’s value. The limitations
of accounting-based measures of performance,
therefore, may explain the lack of perfor-
mance differences in past strategic group
studies.
Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986) showed that
financial market performance measures do not
have such limitations. In a study of 160 firms,
Hoskisson et al. (1993) found that the corre-
lation among three financial market measures
of performance ranged from 0.84 to 0.90.
However, the correlation between these three
measures and two accounting measures of 
performance was much lower, ranging from
0.15 to 0.30. These results indicate that the
financial market measures of performance
provide information about performance over
and above simple accounting measures of 
performance.
In summary, therefore, it is valuable to
examine whether the use of market perfor-
mance measures will help to clarify the rela-
tionship between strategic group membership
and performance. Here we focus on the rela-
tionship between the strategic group mem-
bership of the US pharmaceutical firms
(whose dynamic capabilities in R&D and intan-
gible assets evolve over time) and their finan-
cial market performance. We also investigate
whether performance is more likely to differ
significantly across strategic groups when
financial market performance measures are
used. Hence, the following two hypotheses
are formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Financial market performance
differs across strategic groups.
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Hypothesis 2: Financial market performance
measures provide greater support for 
inter-group performance differences than
accounting-based measures.
Methodology
In the spirit of developing cumulative results
and reinforcing or amending results from
earlier research, this study is built upon the
data and analyses of the US pharmaceutical
industry originally carried out by Bogner
(1991) and Bogner et al. (1994, 1996). The
data set consists of 36 firms from the USA and
Western Europe that competed in the US phar-
maceutical market during the 20-year period
1969–1988.1 The pharmaceutical sector is 
an appropriate competitive environment in
which to conduct this study, given its dynamic
character and inimitable, firm-specific
resources (McGee, 2003). In this industry the
pattern and periodicity of the groups is par-
ticularly well supported from the underlying
economic and legal background and is there-
fore reasonably clear of noise. In the original
studies (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1994,
1996), seven variables were used to reflect
two key competitive resources in the industry:
namely, the firm’s product line profile (four
variables) and its research competence (three
variables).2 Five stable strategic time periods
(SSTP), covering 1969–1988, were also identi-
fied using the well-accepted Fiegenbaum et al.
(1987, 1990) SSTP methodology. Firms were
then clustered for each SSTP using Ward’s
minimum variance algorithm (Fiegenbaum,
1987). This study parallels the framework set
up in these original studies and identifies
membership of each strategic group across the
stable strategic time periods, as shown in
Table 1. Each grouping contains a label that
generally describes the strategic profile of the
members at that time.
Financial market performance data was
obtained from that collected by the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP) at the Uni-
versity of Chicago and accounting data was
sourced from Standard and Poor’s COMPUS-
TAT database. Accounting performance is 
measured by return on assets (ROA) (net
income/total assets (gross)) and return on
invested capital (ROIC) (net income/invested
capital). ROA and ROIC were selected because
most prior research on performance differ-
ences has used these measures of profitability.
Cumulative returns (CRET) and cumulative
beta excess returns (CBRET) are used to
measure financial market performance. CRET
measures the value created during each of the
SSTP and CBRET measures the value created
during each of the SSTP in excess of the value
expected for a firm with a similar risk profile.
CRET measures are highly sensitive to the
choice of period starting and ending dates and
that is why we also use CBRET, which is less
sensitive.
The CRSP daily data file provides data on
daily returns and daily beta excess returns.
Daily returns are calculated on the basis of the
difference between the current day’s closing
price (Pc,(t)) and the previous day’s closing
price (Pc,(t−1)). That is,
Cumulative returns are the sum of daily
returns over the period concerned:
CRET(t,t+n) = Σt+ni=t Ri
Daily beta excess returns to compute CBRET
are also available in the CRSP daily file and are
estimated by the following procedure. Each
stock in the database is assigned to a portfolio
based on its beta (the systematic risk). That is,
each alternative portfolio has stocks with the
R
P P
P
t
c t c t
c t
=
−( ) −( )
−( )
, ,
,
1
1
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1 The data set chosen is a rich database involving careful
choice of variables to reflect scope choices (e.g., thera-
peutic product lines such as cardiovascular, cancer, etc.)
and resource deployments reflecting research compe-
tence (a critically important competitive asset in this
industry). Its richness and coverage of the industry
should allow thorough and cumulative testing of the per-
formance consequences of groups in this industry.
2 The variables chosen are identified at the base of Table
1. In particular, ARD, HRD and RRD measure the firm’s
research competence in terms of R&D. Product line
profile is addressed through the variables HOSP, CHRN,
HMK and RELPROD, reflecting market (e.g., hospital)
and therapeutic class choices.
378 J. Rajendran Pandian et al.
Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Nov–Dec 2006
DOI: 10.1002/jsc
Table 1. Strategic groups in the US pharmaceutical market
–1969 Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four
Medium size Medium size Broad organic Early diversification
limited research moderate research chemistry focus pursuit
Beecham Abbott Labs American Home Products Pfizer
Bolar Bristol-Myers American Cyanamid
ICN Burroughs-Wellcome Hoffmann-LaRoche
Marion Labs Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical
Merrell Johnson & Johnson Merck
Mylan Parke-Davis Searle (G.D.)
Norwich-Eaton Robins (A.H.) Smith Kline & French
Rorer Schering-Plough Syntex
Zenith Sterling Upjohn
Squibb
1970–1977 Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four
Medium size Traditionally Broad organic Generic-like
limited research antibiotics chemistry focus firms
Beecham Abbott Ciba-Geigy Barr
Boots American Cyanamid Hoechst Bolar
Bristol-Myers American Home Products Hoffman-LaRoche Marion Labs
Burroughs-Wellcome Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical Merrell
ICN Squibb Merck Mylan
Rorer Warner-Lambert Pfizer Norwich-Eaton
Robins (A.H.) Sandoz Par
Johnson & Johnson Searle (G.D.) Zenith
Schering-Plough Smith Kline & French
Sterling
Syntex
1978–1980 Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four Group Five
Medium size Traditionally Broad organic Generic-like Heavy patenters
limited research antibiotics chemistry focus firms
Burroughs-Wellcome American Home Product Ciba-Geigy Barr Abbott Labs
Glaxo Beecham Hoechst Bolar American Cyanamid
Johnson & Johnson Bristol-Myers Hoffmann-LaRoche Boots
Robins (A.H.) Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical ICN
Rorer Pfizer Merck Marion Labs
Schering-Plough Smith Kline & French Sandoz Merrell
Searle (G.D.) Squibb Sterling Mylan
Syntex Warner-Lambert Upjohn Norwich-Eaton
Par
Zenith
1981–1984 Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four Group Five
Lagging research Medium size Large size Generic firms Diagnostic thrust
firms assertive research assertive research
Boots American Home Products American Cyanamid Barr Abbott Labs
ICN Bristol-Myers Beecham Bolar
Marion Labs Burroughs-Wellcome Cuba-Geigy Par
Merrell Glaxo Eli Lilly Zenith
Mylan Johnson & Johnson Hoechst
Norwich-Eaton Robins (A.H.) Hoffmann-LaRoche
Rorer Schering-Plough Imperial Chemical
Searle (G.D.) Merck
Smith Kline & French Pfizer
Syntex Sandoz
Warner-Lambert Squibb
Sterling
Upjohn
1985– Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four Group Five
Lagging research Narrow focus Broad focus Generic firms Diagnostic thrust
firms research firms research firms
Boots Burroughs-Wellcome American Cyanamid Barr Abbott Labs
ICN Glaxo American Home Products Bolar
Marion Labs Johnson & Johnson Beecham Mylan
Merrell Dow Bristol-Myers Par
Norwich-Eaton Ciba-Geigy Zenith
Robins (A.H.) Eli Lilly
Rorer Hoechst
Sterling Hoffmann-LaRoche
same beta. Portfolio returns are estimated daily
and the difference between the daily returns
of a stock and the daily portfolio returns are
the beta excess returns. That is,
XRb,t = Rt − Rb,t
where XRb,t are the daily beta excess returns
and Rb,t are the returns to the same beta port-
folio. Cumulative beta excess returns are the
sum of daily beta excess returns over the
period examined:
CBRET(t,t+n) = Σt+ni=t XRbi
where CBRET(t,t+n) are the cumulative beta
excess returns and XRbi are the daily beta
excess returns. This measure has been used in
other studies in strategic management (e.g.,
Nayyar, 1993).
Many researchers in finance have argued
that a firm’s financial market value and risk
level are influenced by its capital structure
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore,
we use the debt-to-equity ratio (long-term
debt/equity) to assess the effects of financial
leverage. Debt-to-equity was chosen over
other measures of leverage or gearing (e.g.,
debt/total assets) because it is unaffected by
changes in working capital and other liabilities
(Gibbs, 1993).
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) are used
to test the first hypothesis, namely that finan-
cial market performance differs across strate-
gic groups and these analyses are carried out
for each stable strategic time period. The
second hypothesis is tested using a two-tailed
test for difference between proportions.
Findings
The results of the ANCOVA analyses are pre-
sented in Table 2. The cumulative returns
(CRET) are found to be significantly different
across strategic groups for the last two periods
(covering the period from 1981 to 1988) while
they are not significantly different for the first
three periods (covering the period from 1969
to 1980). Table 2 also shows that beta excess
returns (CBRET) differ significantly across
Performance differences across strategic groups 379
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Table 1. Continued
Imperial Chemical
Merck
Pfizer
Sandoz
Schering-Plough
Searle (G.D.)
SmithKline Beecham
Squibb
Syntex
Upjohn
Warner-Lambert
Significant variables in clustering (F statistic)
Variables Periods
–19691 1970–19772 1978–19803 1981–19843 1985–3
ARD 72.71*** 114.53*** 159.23*** 82.26*** 45.44***
RRD 7.58** 49.54*** 31.81*** 0.02 9.07***
HRD 3.33** 0.32 1.90 0.88 3.08**
HOSP 1.88 3.94** 4.51*** 5.90*** 8.44**
CHRN 0.85 1.93 0.50 1.63 10.58***
HMK 4.75*** 1.37 3.52** 0.12 4.18**
RELPROD 18.87*** 13.51*** 21.58*** 14.65*** 44.07***
ARD = 1-year absolute level of R&D, RRD = 7-year relative level of R&D, HRD = concentration of R&D by research class in each
year for each firm, HOSP = portion of product line directed towards hospital market, CHRN = portion of product line directed
towards chronic care market, HMK = concentration of drugs by therapeutic classes in each year for each firm, RELPROD = firm’s
new products as a percentage of industry total.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; 129 d.f.; 234 d.f.; 335 d.f.
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strategic groups for three periods — the first
period and the last two periods covering
1981–1988 — but there is no significant dif-
ference observed for the other two periods
covering the period 1970–1980. To compare
the roles of financial market measures and
accounting measures in identifying group 
performance differences, we also report the
results of ANCOVA using accounting measures
(ROA and ROIC) in this table. The results indi-
cate that performance differences across
groups using ROA and ROIC are not found to
be significant except for the last period, which
is from 1985 to 1988.
A significance test for a difference in 
proportions is used to see if financial market
measures are better than accounting-based
measures in identifying performance differ-
ences across strategic groups.The result of the
test returns a p-value of 0.064, i.e., clearly sig-
nificant at the 10% level, which is acceptable
given that we only have five SSTP in the data
set. Based on this finding we conclude that the
use of financial market measures provides
better support for inter-group performance
differences than the use of accounting-based
measures of performance.
The lack of a similar relationship for
accounting measures can be explained by the
fact that financial leverage (debt/equity) was
an important strategic variable over the entire
period for all firms. Accounting measures
(ROA and ROIC) are highly correlated with
leverage/gearing, since the higher the
debt/equity ratio the higher the interest
expense and the lower the net income, the
numerator in both the formula for ROA and
ROIC. Comparatively, financial market perfor-
mance is much less correlated with firm-level
financial variables (Hoskisson et al., 1993).
Discussion of the results
On examining the time periods when perfor-
mance measured by financial market data 
did not differ across strategic groups (i.e.,
1970–1980), it was observed that the mean
beta excess returns across all groups was neg-
ative. That observation can be interpreted to
indicate that the period 1970–80 was proba-
bly the worst decade for firm returns in the
pharmaceutical industry as a whole compared
with firms of similar risk in other industries.
The financial market valued these firms and
their strategies much below firms of similar
risk levels. It should be noted (Bogner, 1992)
that in the 1960s, pharmaceutical firms were
suffering from a marked absence of new
product developments, new drug approvals
and new chemical entities, which therefore
weakened their cash flow and profitability
profile in the 1970s, given the large time lags
— typically 10 to 15 years — that exist
between product development and the estab-
lishment of a firm’s stable drug product profile
in the ethical sector of the industry. In addi-
tion, the presence of a strengthening dollar
over that period hurt profit repatriations from
Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Nov–Dec 2006
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Table 2. Results of ANCOVA (F statistic)
Periods: Independent variables –19691 1970–19772 1978–19803 1981–19843 1985–3
Dependent variables (SSTP 1) (SSTP 2) (SSTP 3) (SSTP 4) (SSTP 5)
CRET Strategic group 2.51 0.49 0.19 5.48** 3.39*
Debt/equity ratio 1.26 1.71 0.10 3.57* 10.09**
CBRET Strategic group 4.53** 0.13 0.06 4.46** 10.12***
Debt/equity ratio 1.03 1.17 0.58 2.46 17.94***
ROA Strategic group 1.01 0.53 0.60 0.84 8.53***
Debt/equity ratio 17.68*** 28.87*** 24.38*** 3.41* 10.83***
ROIC Strategic group 0.80 0.52 0.49 1.91 3.94**
Debt/equity ratio 14.53*** 99.93*** 21.33*** 19.17*** 7.65**
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Number of observations for accounting data-based performance analyses: 118; 221; 317.
Number of observations for financial market data-based performance analyses: 115; 217; 313.
the overseas subsidiaries of these predomi-
nantly multinational firms. Furthermore,
during this decade the mean cumulative
returns were positive across all but two strate-
gic groups, indicating that most of these firms’
stocks gained value but not as much as for
similar beta firms. Mean cumulative returns for
the strategic groups varied from −0.32 to 0.30
during SSTP 2 and from 0.22 to 0.96 during
SSTP 3. There was a differential gain in share-
holder value across strategic groups but taking
into account intra-group variance, these dif-
ferences were not statistically significant.
Mean beta excess returns varied from −0.72 to
−0.63 during SSTP 2 and from −0.47 to −0.26
during SSTP 3. Although there were differ-
ences across the groups, these differences
were not statistically significant. These find-
ings warrant examination of the gain in share-
holder value of each firm and such an
examination should provide more insight into
the presence of possible outliers that caused
the lack of significance in the statistical analy-
sis — or, alternatively, focus analysis on the
distinctive resources possessed by each indi-
vidual firm and the success of individual drug
firms (e.g., Pfizer, Merck) in producing new
drugs and product profitability.
There are some other interesting observa-
tions. From SSTP 3 on (i.e., from 1978 to
1985), all strategic groups have positive mean
cumulative returns but not all the mean beta
excess return measures were positive. This
means that from 1978 through to 1985 all
firms gained in value but the gain was on
average lower than for similar beta firms. In
SSTP 5, the mean cumulative returns ranged
from 0.15 to 0.55 and the mean beta excess
returns ranged from −0.15 to 0.30. Equally
importantly, the analysis of variance found sig-
nificant differences across strategic groups
once the effect of financial leverage is con-
trolled for in both measures. Further, mean
cumulative returns and mean beta excess
returns are highly correlated during this
period, as can be seen in Table 2 by noticing
that the strategic group with the lowest mean
cumulative returns also has the lowest mean
beta excess return, and so on.
Another interesting observation is that the
difference in accounting performance across
strategic groups (for example, only for the
1985–8 SSTP) is probably explained by the
strong differences in financial leverage across
the groups.
Conclusion
This research finds that performance differ-
ences exist across strategic groups more fre-
quently with financial market rather than
accounting-based measures of performance.
The results of ANCOVA show that significant
performance differences are identified across
strategic groups for three of the five SSTP,
using financial market measures (CBRET).
Indeed, in the two cases where non-significant
results were obtained (i.e., for the 1970–1980
time period), we reported that the adverse
economic and strategic conditions present in
the pharmaceutical industry over that period
created relatively low profitability and homo-
geneity in the average company’s strategic
profile.
We believe that the continued use of better
constructs, particularly for financial market-
based performance measures, should enable
competitive strategy researchers to identify
stronger relationships between strategic group
membership and financial performance.
Further, this study adds to the findings of the
carefully researched Bogner et al. (1996) work
of the industry, by linking group membership
more clearly to performance through the use
of improved, modern financial market-based
measures of performance.
We suggest that the results of this study,
along with more positive evidence of perfor-
mance differences in recent studies (e.g., Nair
and Kotha, 2001), provides a rationale for re-
examining the performance consequences of
strategic group membership using not only
improved financial market-based performance
constructs but also improved methods for
forming groups (e.g., Zuniga-Vicente et al.,
2004). Indeed, industries and databases pre-
viously studied, such as retailing (Athanas-
soupoulos, 2003), insurance (Fiegenbaum and
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Thomas, 1990, 1995) and steel (Nair and
Kotha, 2001), should be the subjects of
enquiry with the aim of establishing a more
consistent and cumulative stream of evidence
to support or refute the relationship between
strategic group membership and perfor-
mance.Thus, the competing claims of theories
of competitive strategy, such as the so-called
‘strategy/conduct/performance’ paradigm
(Porter, 1979), or the resource-based view
(Wernerfelt, 1984), to provide explanations of
intra-industry performance differences can be
systematically examined and, in turn, lead to
further theory building for the long-term 
theoretical growth of the field of strategic
management.
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